Greenstar Environmental Ltd (Greenstar) is set to become a major player in the industrial, commercial and domestic recycling industry as following its re-branding, it takes the first steps in a highly ambitious growth strategy.
Formerly Material Recovery Ltd, the adoption of the Greenstar brand brings the UK-based company into line with the ideals and identity of its popular Irish counterpart – with both companies being majority owned subsidiaries of Ireland-based NTR plc. But the re-branding is just the first step in a major growth plan that is already taking shape thanks to the recent purchase of Wastelink Services Ltd and RU Recycling Ltd.
The UK currently resides in the bottom three in the European recycling table.
As a recycling-led waste management company with an increasing infrastructure, Greenstar is in a strong position to help the UK address its tough recycling targets.
According to managing director, Ian Wakelin: "Over the last few years the management of waste and the development of recycling initiatives has become a big issue in the UK. Due to the increased value placed on corporate social responsibility, legislation and the continually increasing landfill tax, large companies and local authorities have had to evolve their waste management strategies – with many of them turning to Greenstar for our expertise and support. The Greenstar name is extremely well known in Ireland and by changing our name we are taking the first steps in creating a global brand, committed to delivering recycling-led waste management solutions." The first step in this growth strategy has involved the purchase of two companies well known for their recycling expertise, services and facilities.
The purchase of Wastelink has, overnight, turned Greenstar into one of the largest recycling-led waste management companies in the UK. As well as giving Greenstar more geographic options it also brings with it a host of capabilities within the industrial and commercial markets. Wakelin explains: "Industrial and commercial markets are really looking for a long term partner when it comes to waste management as well as one that can develop recycling-led strategies to help reduce costs. New legislation continues to evolve and make the pro-active management of waste a key issue as an example, with the WEEE directive just around the corner, companies are going to see even tougher regimes being introduced. With the purchase of Wastelink we have enhanced our existing capabilities and we can now offer and even broader single point of contact for all industrial and commercial waste customers."
The second acquisition, R U Recycling Ltd, further expands Greenstar’s ability to recycle post consumer domestic recyclables. R U Recycling currently operates a 50,000 tonne per year comingled Materials Recycling Facility (MRF) in Lancashire, working with 19 local authorities from around the UK. Following the acquisition Greenstar plans to open one of the UK’s largest domestic recycling facilities, close to the centre of Birmingham. With Greenstar’s existing Lincolnshire site the company will have access to three major recycling centres across the UK with the creation of more forming part of future plans.
Wakelin concludes: "The re-branding and acquisitions are just the first steps on an ambitious growth plan. Having the right services, the right people and the right facilities in place and utilising the best technologies available in the industry will put us well on the road towards creating a substantial recycling lead waste management business that will help the UK address what are set to become even more stringent recycling targets."
Source: http://www.greenstar.co.uk/news-greenstar_strategy.aspx
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Strategies to Fight Low-Cost Rivals
Companies have only three options: attack, coexist uneasily, or become low-cost players themselves. None of them is easy, but the right framework can help you learn which strategy is most likely to work.
Companies find it challenging and yet strangely reassuring to take on opponents whose strategies, strengths, and weaknesses resemble their own. Their obsession with familiar rivals, however, has blinded them to threats from disruptive, low-cost competitors.
Successful price warriors, such as the German retailer Aldi, are changing the nature of competition by employing several tactics: focusing on just one or a few consumer segments, delivering the basic product or providing one benefit better than rivals do, and backing low prices with superefficient operations. Ignoring cut-price rivals is a mistake because they eventually force companies to vacate entire market segments. Price wars are not the answer, either: Slashing prices usually lowers profits for incumbents without driving the low-cost entrants out of business.
Companies take various approaches to competing against cut-price players. Some differentiate their products—a strategy that works only in certain circumstances. Others launch low-cost businesses of their own, as many airlines did in the 1990s—a so-called dual strategy that succeeds only if companies can generate synergies between the existing businesses and the new ventures, as the financial service providers HSBC and ING did. Without synergies, corporations are better off trying to transform themselves into low-cost players, a difficult feat that Ryanair accomplished in the 1990s, or into solution providers.
There will always be room for both low-cost and value-added players. How much room each will have depends not only on the industry and customers’ preferences, but also on the strategies traditional businesses deploy.
Wednesday, November 7, 2007
PGA Tour events highlight charitable efforts
The PGA Tour Inc. and The Players Championship are taking a new approach to its annual charitable efforts.
The Tour traditionally announced its charitable donations at a Downtown luncheon, but has scrapped that in favor of a series of events next week featuring Tour pros and other local professional athletes. The Players Championship donated $2.7 million to charities last year and will top that figure this year, though the official figure has not been released.
Dubbed Giving Back Week, the events start Nov. 5 with Tour pro Mark McCumber, former Jaguar Pete Mitchell and the Nease High School golf team caddying for children playing miniature golf who are being treated at Nemours Children's Clinic. The event highlights the Tom Coughlin Jay Fund.
On Nov. 6, 2005 Players winner Fred Funk will lead a 5th-grade class at Pine Forest Elementary as part of Junior Achievement, while members of his local fan club will lead other classes.
The next day Tour pro Jim Furyk, former Jaguar Tony Boselli, former pro tennis player MaliVai Washington and their wives will participate in an event at Emmett Reed Park that will include a ribbon-cutting for a new driving range.
On Nov. 8, golfing Hall of Famer Judy Rankin and Tour pro Len Mattiace will introduce a class which promotes the healing process for breast cancer survivors through the game of golf.
And on Nov. 10, former Tour pro Calvin Peete and representatives from UBS will hold a financial education class and golf tournament for members of The First Tee of Jacksonville and their parents.
(Source :http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2007/10/29/daily14.html?surround=lfn)
The Tour traditionally announced its charitable donations at a Downtown luncheon, but has scrapped that in favor of a series of events next week featuring Tour pros and other local professional athletes. The Players Championship donated $2.7 million to charities last year and will top that figure this year, though the official figure has not been released.
Dubbed Giving Back Week, the events start Nov. 5 with Tour pro Mark McCumber, former Jaguar Pete Mitchell and the Nease High School golf team caddying for children playing miniature golf who are being treated at Nemours Children's Clinic. The event highlights the Tom Coughlin Jay Fund.
On Nov. 6, 2005 Players winner Fred Funk will lead a 5th-grade class at Pine Forest Elementary as part of Junior Achievement, while members of his local fan club will lead other classes.
The next day Tour pro Jim Furyk, former Jaguar Tony Boselli, former pro tennis player MaliVai Washington and their wives will participate in an event at Emmett Reed Park that will include a ribbon-cutting for a new driving range.
On Nov. 8, golfing Hall of Famer Judy Rankin and Tour pro Len Mattiace will introduce a class which promotes the healing process for breast cancer survivors through the game of golf.
And on Nov. 10, former Tour pro Calvin Peete and representatives from UBS will hold a financial education class and golf tournament for members of The First Tee of Jacksonville and their parents.
(Source :http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2007/10/29/daily14.html?surround=lfn)
Reasons why mergers and acquisitions can fail
Buying an organization can be likened to buying a secondhand car. The seller is going to highlight the positives while concealing or downplaying vulnerable problems.
First List 2000 reports approximately 50 percent to 70 percent of merger/acquisition (M&A) deals fail. Yet, despite the high failure rate, HR magazine reported that in 1998 there were approximately 11,655 domestic M/A deals compared to 5,654 transactions in 1990. The good news is that the business world is finally beginning to recognize the dynamics that lead to failure:
Technology Integration.
PricewaterhouseCoopers' recently surveyed senior executives from 125 companies worldwide to determine the biggest hurdles of M&A deals and found that integrating information systems is the toughest post-deal challenge. Nearly three out of four companies reported problems integrating information systems after a merger.
Culture Shock.
Mergers are like marriages. The right partner must be selected after an honest and meaningful courtship. There must be communication, flexibility and mutual respect.
Organizational culture is a blend of an organization's values, traditions, beliefs and priorities. Also, it helps determine and legitimize what sort of behavior is rewarded in an organization.
The very minute that merger rumblings are heard in an organization, the work climate begins to change. Employees become emotionally confused and anxious, similar to how one might feel when a mate makes an abrupt announcement demanding a divorce. The initial feeling is one of betrayal.
Employees begin to divert time and energy to wonder how their career, power and prestige will be impacted. Gossip within the organization competes with production and then the competition can gain a foothold.
Combining merged cultures requires a focus on one new vision and one new mission, developed by a cross-section team of representatives from both organizations. Problems typically occur when the larger or stronger of the two organizations try to significantly influence the integration.
Jim Shaffer, of Towers Perrin Management Consulting, has a high success rate in linking M&A deals, and offers recommendations to avoid M&A culture problems:
1. Create frequent communications that include all stakeholders-employees, suppliers, customers, government leaders and the community.
2. Managers must always tell the truth, with their actions matching their words. Even the appearance of a single falsehood will break confidence, erode trust and hinder short-term and possibly long-term productivity.
3. Listen. During the M&A process, senior management must facilitate the birth of a new or modified culture by inspiring a new vision. This can be an impossible task without listening to the concerns of people at all levels through the process.
4. Identify the talent in both organizations that would leave the greatest gap if they were to leave. Bailing out is contagious. Focus a disparate amount of energy to retain talent support and commitment.
5. Building revenue and market position are the primary motivators behind mergers and acquisitions, but acquiring management and technical talent has also emerged as one of the top deal drivers cited by almost half of executives in the recent PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of M&A activity.
Freda Turner, Ph.D., researches best workplace productivity and business practices and is affiliated with the Doctoral and Graduate Studies Programs, University of Phoenix.She is available for presentations and may be reached at er@email.uophx.edu.
(Source: http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2000/08/28/)
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
HP and Compaq Merger Failure Analysis
The failure of the merger between two leading competitors in the global computer industry, Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) and Compaq Computer Corporation (Compaq) failed as the synergies identified prior to the merger did not materialize.
HP bought Compaq for US$ 24 billion in stock. This was the largest ever deal in the history of the computer industry. The deal meant combined operations in more than 160 countries and more than 145,000 employees. HP-Compaq would offer the most complete set of products and services in the computer industry.
The motivation behind a HP-Compaq merger (whether it made economic sense) and the problems encountered in merging operations is an interesting discussion as the stock prices of both HP and Compaq fell within two days of the merger announcement. An estimated 13 billion dollars was lost (in terms of market capitalization) in this time frame.
Shares fell further as industry analysts failed to understand the benefits HP would derive by acquiring Compaq. HP was a market leader in the high margin printer’s business and Compaq, a low-margin personal computer (PC) manufacturer. Moreover, established players like direct marketer, Dell and leading IT service consulting company like IBM would give fierce competition even if economies of scale were to be achieved.
With the stock price of HP’s shares stabilising at a level much below than before the merger and the PC & other hardware businesses not making much profits, the merger was ruled a failure. Industry experts felt that HP’s printer business should be spun off into a separate entity.
Merger Challenges:
Product line integration: This requires discontinuing some products (some loss in revenue) thereby rationalizing the product line.
Reorganization: In the computer industry this has always been a failure.
Cultural change challenges: HP’s culture is largely based on engineering and compromise, while Compaq had a hard-charging sales culture.
HP bought Compaq for US$ 24 billion in stock. This was the largest ever deal in the history of the computer industry. The deal meant combined operations in more than 160 countries and more than 145,000 employees. HP-Compaq would offer the most complete set of products and services in the computer industry.
The motivation behind a HP-Compaq merger (whether it made economic sense) and the problems encountered in merging operations is an interesting discussion as the stock prices of both HP and Compaq fell within two days of the merger announcement. An estimated 13 billion dollars was lost (in terms of market capitalization) in this time frame.
Shares fell further as industry analysts failed to understand the benefits HP would derive by acquiring Compaq. HP was a market leader in the high margin printer’s business and Compaq, a low-margin personal computer (PC) manufacturer. Moreover, established players like direct marketer, Dell and leading IT service consulting company like IBM would give fierce competition even if economies of scale were to be achieved.
With the stock price of HP’s shares stabilising at a level much below than before the merger and the PC & other hardware businesses not making much profits, the merger was ruled a failure. Industry experts felt that HP’s printer business should be spun off into a separate entity.
Merger Challenges:
Product line integration: This requires discontinuing some products (some loss in revenue) thereby rationalizing the product line.
Reorganization: In the computer industry this has always been a failure.
Cultural change challenges: HP’s culture is largely based on engineering and compromise, while Compaq had a hard-charging sales culture.
Saturday, November 3, 2007
Kodak rolls up earnings of $34M
(November 2, 2007) — Since the start of 2004, Eastman Kodak Co. has focused on reinventing itself as a digitally based firm, launching new products and demolishing swaths of its huge Kodak Park industrial park.
That work is showing some dividends, as digital sales and lower manufacturing costs helped push the area's second-largest employer into the black for the third quarter of 2007. Kodak also slightly scaled back the estimated price tag — and estimated size of layoffs — in its restructuring plans.
It marked only the third profitable quarter for Kodak since 2004. The Fortune 500 photo and imaging company released its third-quarter financial results on Thursday.
Kodak netted $34 million in income on sales of $2.581 billion. For the comparable quarter a year ago, Kodak lost $83 million.
Overall sales for the quarter were down minutely from $2.595 billion the company saw in last year's third quarter. But sales in digital products were up 12 percent to $1.589 billion. Earnings on the digital side of the business were $82 million, up from $28 million the same quarter last year.
"We had good market success with our new digital products," Kodak CEO Antonio Perez said in a conference call with Wall Street analysts. "Everything is in motion to achieve our key objectives."
Analysts polled by Thomson Financial had expected earnings of 27 cents per share. Kodak well exceeded that with an operating profit of 45 cents a share.
Kodak stock finished the day at $27.76 a share, down 90 cents, on a day when all the major market indexes dropped notably.
With its financial filings, Kodak also announced it expects its four-year restructuring ultimately will cost $3.4 billion to $3.6 billion as it sheds 27,000 to 28,000 jobs worldwide. The company previously had estimated restructuring would mean 28,000 to 30,000 job cuts and spending $3.6 billion to $3.8 billion on severance packages and demolitions.
During the third quarter, the company cut about 775 jobs in the United States and Canada and 650 elsewhere.
"It looks like after a difficult four years Kodak's digital plan is coming through," said Bill Shaheen, CEO of Rochester investment firm Whitney & Co. "The implementation of it is showing higher sales, stable margins and lower need for cost cuts to deal with the restructuring. If they can continue this over the next few quarters the turnaround could be well on its way."
Overall, $1 invested a year ago in Kodak would have netted $1.17, vs. a $1.10 return on a $1 invested with the S&P 500, according to Economic Investor analysis service.
Almost all of Kodak's film production is in Rochester. And that side of the business had mixed results for the quarter. Its Film Products Group saw sales of $488 million, down $105 million from the same quarter a year ago. Sales of consumer film, disposable cameras and related products were down 32 percent. But Kodak said the Film Products Group's earnings went up $7 million, to $122 million, for the quarter largely because of decreased manufacturing costs.
The ongoing demolitions at Kodak Park also added to the bottom line. According to the company, its gross profit margin was 26.4 percent, up 1.3 percentage points from a year ago, largely the result of lower costs from what the company calls its "manufacturing footprint reductions."
The company's 2006 figures do not reflect income or sales from its health group, which it sold earlier this year.
(Source: http://www.rochesterdandc.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071102/BUSINESS/711020354)
That work is showing some dividends, as digital sales and lower manufacturing costs helped push the area's second-largest employer into the black for the third quarter of 2007. Kodak also slightly scaled back the estimated price tag — and estimated size of layoffs — in its restructuring plans.
It marked only the third profitable quarter for Kodak since 2004. The Fortune 500 photo and imaging company released its third-quarter financial results on Thursday.
Kodak netted $34 million in income on sales of $2.581 billion. For the comparable quarter a year ago, Kodak lost $83 million.
Overall sales for the quarter were down minutely from $2.595 billion the company saw in last year's third quarter. But sales in digital products were up 12 percent to $1.589 billion. Earnings on the digital side of the business were $82 million, up from $28 million the same quarter last year.
"We had good market success with our new digital products," Kodak CEO Antonio Perez said in a conference call with Wall Street analysts. "Everything is in motion to achieve our key objectives."
Analysts polled by Thomson Financial had expected earnings of 27 cents per share. Kodak well exceeded that with an operating profit of 45 cents a share.
Kodak stock finished the day at $27.76 a share, down 90 cents, on a day when all the major market indexes dropped notably.
With its financial filings, Kodak also announced it expects its four-year restructuring ultimately will cost $3.4 billion to $3.6 billion as it sheds 27,000 to 28,000 jobs worldwide. The company previously had estimated restructuring would mean 28,000 to 30,000 job cuts and spending $3.6 billion to $3.8 billion on severance packages and demolitions.
During the third quarter, the company cut about 775 jobs in the United States and Canada and 650 elsewhere.
"It looks like after a difficult four years Kodak's digital plan is coming through," said Bill Shaheen, CEO of Rochester investment firm Whitney & Co. "The implementation of it is showing higher sales, stable margins and lower need for cost cuts to deal with the restructuring. If they can continue this over the next few quarters the turnaround could be well on its way."
Overall, $1 invested a year ago in Kodak would have netted $1.17, vs. a $1.10 return on a $1 invested with the S&P 500, according to Economic Investor analysis service.
Almost all of Kodak's film production is in Rochester. And that side of the business had mixed results for the quarter. Its Film Products Group saw sales of $488 million, down $105 million from the same quarter a year ago. Sales of consumer film, disposable cameras and related products were down 32 percent. But Kodak said the Film Products Group's earnings went up $7 million, to $122 million, for the quarter largely because of decreased manufacturing costs.
The ongoing demolitions at Kodak Park also added to the bottom line. According to the company, its gross profit margin was 26.4 percent, up 1.3 percentage points from a year ago, largely the result of lower costs from what the company calls its "manufacturing footprint reductions."
The company's 2006 figures do not reflect income or sales from its health group, which it sold earlier this year.
(Source: http://www.rochesterdandc.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071102/BUSINESS/711020354)
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
How Dell, and Amazon.com Succeed in their supply chain?
Consider a PC manufacturer. Typically a PC manufacturer builds to stock and thus makes all production and distribution decisions based on forecast. This is a typical push system. In a push/pull strategy, the manufacturer will build to order. This implies that component inventory is managed based on forecast, but the final assembly is made in response to a specific customer request. So, the push part is part of the manufacturer’s supply chain prior to assembly, while the pull part is the part of the supply chain that starts with assembly and is based on actual customer demand. Dell Computers is an excellent example of the impact the push / pull system has on supply chain performance.
The book industry is a good example of the evolution of supply chain strategies from push to pull and then to push /pull. Barnes and Noble, for example, has a typical push supply chain. When Amazon.com started about four years ago, its supply chain was a pure pull system — with no warehouses and no stock. Actually, Ingram Books filled orders to meet customer demand. But this arrangement simply did not work well. Today, Amazon.com has seven warehouses around the country where it stocks most of the titles it sells. Thus, inventory at the warehouses is managed based on a push strategy (based on forecast) while demand is satisfied based on individual request, a pull strategy.
The online grocery industry is another excellent example. When Peapod was founded 11 years ago, the idea was to establish a pure pull strategy with no inventory and no facilities. When a customer ordered groceries, Peapod would pick up the products at a nearby supermarket. Unfortunately, stock-out rates at the supermarkets were very high. In the last few years, Peapod changed its business model to a push / pull strategy, adding a number of warehouses; stockout rates are now less than 2%. Of course, in this industry there are other challenges, especially reducing transportation costs. The problem is that no online grocer has the geographic density of customers that will allow them to control transportation costs and therefore compete with traditional supermarkets.
So, this sounds as though online distributors need to have an infra s t r u c t u re of, ye s, good old warehouses and distribution centers around the country or world.
Precisely, In that respect, brick-and-mortar to click-and-mortar companies (those that have added an Internet shopping to their services) have a huge advantage over the pure Internet companies.
They already have distribution and warehousing infrastructure in place. Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Target and Barnes and Noble, as a few examples, have all established virtual retail stores, serviced by their existing warehousing and distribution structures. As a result of going online, click-and-mortars have now changed their approaches to stocking their various warehouses. High volume products or products for which the demand can be matched with supply, are stocked locally in the stores, while low volume products are stocked centrally for online purchasing.
(Source: http://slevi1.mit.edu/docs/psd.pdf) by Penny Guyer is editor of Parcel Shipping &
Distribution and is manager of Mail and Shipping Services at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
The book industry is a good example of the evolution of supply chain strategies from push to pull and then to push /pull. Barnes and Noble, for example, has a typical push supply chain. When Amazon.com started about four years ago, its supply chain was a pure pull system — with no warehouses and no stock. Actually, Ingram Books filled orders to meet customer demand. But this arrangement simply did not work well. Today, Amazon.com has seven warehouses around the country where it stocks most of the titles it sells. Thus, inventory at the warehouses is managed based on a push strategy (based on forecast) while demand is satisfied based on individual request, a pull strategy.
The online grocery industry is another excellent example. When Peapod was founded 11 years ago, the idea was to establish a pure pull strategy with no inventory and no facilities. When a customer ordered groceries, Peapod would pick up the products at a nearby supermarket. Unfortunately, stock-out rates at the supermarkets were very high. In the last few years, Peapod changed its business model to a push / pull strategy, adding a number of warehouses; stockout rates are now less than 2%. Of course, in this industry there are other challenges, especially reducing transportation costs. The problem is that no online grocer has the geographic density of customers that will allow them to control transportation costs and therefore compete with traditional supermarkets.
So, this sounds as though online distributors need to have an infra s t r u c t u re of, ye s, good old warehouses and distribution centers around the country or world.
Precisely, In that respect, brick-and-mortar to click-and-mortar companies (those that have added an Internet shopping to their services) have a huge advantage over the pure Internet companies.
They already have distribution and warehousing infrastructure in place. Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Target and Barnes and Noble, as a few examples, have all established virtual retail stores, serviced by their existing warehousing and distribution structures. As a result of going online, click-and-mortars have now changed their approaches to stocking their various warehouses. High volume products or products for which the demand can be matched with supply, are stocked locally in the stores, while low volume products are stocked centrally for online purchasing.
(Source: http://slevi1.mit.edu/docs/psd.pdf) by Penny Guyer is editor of Parcel Shipping &
Distribution and is manager of Mail and Shipping Services at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
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